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8  |  Parasitic politics: violence, deception  
and change in Kenya’s electoral politics
Jacob Rasmussen
Introduction
We are not a violent organisation. But I can’t say that some of our members 
weren’t violent [during the 2008 post-electoral violence]. It is young men; of 
course they are angry. The government can’t tell them not to be angry.1
Since the introduction of multiparty elections in Kenya in 1992, the electoral 
process has been characterised by violence in one way or another (Fjelde and 
Höglund, Chapter 1 in this volume). In 1992 and 1997, interethnic violence and 
militia-driven persecution of opposition supporters in the run-up to the elec-
tions killed several hundreds of people (Kagwanja 2001). The 2007 December 
elections erupted into interethnic and militant violence that killed 1,500 people 
and displaced more than half a million (Kagwanja and Southall 2010). Even the 
supposedly peaceful elections of 2002 and 2013, where a lot of resources were 
put into preventing and containing violence, saw hundreds of people killed 
in the months leading up to the elections (Merino 2014; Mutahi 2005). The 
dynamics and expressions of violence might have differed from one election 
to the next, and some of the violent actors have also changed over time, but 
the politicisation of ethnic identities, the instrumentalisation of youth militias, 
and the excessive use of force by the state security services have been central 
components of the violence that has surrounded and affected democratic elec-
tions in Kenya (Mueller 2008; Thibon 2014). As shown in the introduction to 
this volume, these elements are far from unique to Kenya; on the contrary, 
they are driving factors in much electoral violence across the world.
This chapter approaches electoral participation as anything from voting to 
violent action (Laakso 2007). The chapter investigates the Mungiki movement, 
one of the most dominant violent non-state actors in Kenyan electoral politics 
since the late 1990s. Looking at Mungiki’s shifting roles as youth grassroots 
organisation, violent ethnic militia, political party and religious organisation 
across the last three elections (2002, 2007 and 2013), the chapter approaches 
electoral violence – in line with the ambitions of this volume – as violent acts 
or threats of violence affecting the electoral results or the electoral process 
prior to or after the actual vote. As such, the analysis of Mungiki’s role in 




electoral violence is not necessarily limited to periods of close proximity to 
the elections; rather, electoral violence in an emerging and transformative 
democracy such as Kenya can occur in temporal isolation from the elections 
yet have a huge impact or be informed by the electoral process (cf. Bekoe 
2012; Burchard 2015). To add perspective to the analysis of Mungiki’s peculiar 
practices, the chapter draws parallels with the wider characteristics of Kenyan 
politics. Hence, the analysis of Mungiki as a central actor in Kenya’s recent 
history of electoral violence also provides a contextual analysis of the move-
ment’s relation to the Kenyan state and Kenyan politics, which has strong 
elements of ethnic politicisation and patronage politics (cf. Bratton and van 
de Walle 1997; Utas 2012).
Politics in Kenya is often described as a politics of deception or a politics of 
intrigue, known in the lingua franca Kiswahili as ‘Siasa za kumalizana’. Politics 
in this perception is a game concerned with outsmarting the opponent by all 
means, often for personal gain or the gains of the ethnic community.2 This 
aspect of Kenyan politics and political practice is often emphasised during 
national elections and it relates to another recurrent phrase characterising 
the ethnic dimension of electoral politics and the hopes of winning: ‘It is our 
turn to eat.’ This expression refers to the politicisation of ethnic identities and 
the expectation of politicians with a particular ethnic association to take care 
of their ethnic constituencies after electoral victory (Branch and Cheeseman 
2010: 1). This effectively captures politics as a zero-sum game with a winner 
and a loser, where the gains of the winner equal the losses of the loser. As 
emphasised in the introduction to this volume and repeated in the literature 
on electoral conflicts, the higher the stakes in the elections, the more likely 
the risk of violence (Collier 2010).
Through the notion of ‘parasitic politics’, the chapter explores how the 
Mungiki movement buys into the noted characterisations of Kenyan politics 
as deceptive and driven by an appetite for power and the hope for ethnic 
redistribution. Parasitic politics is used to diagnose and explain a particular 
kind of political practice in which democratic participation and violent prac-
tices merge through the ability to transform, deceive and live of one’s ‘other’ 
(in the case of Mungiki, the ‘other’ is either the Kenyan state, the Kikuyu 
political and economic elite, or the population as a whole). The merger of 
democratic politics and the potential for violence in the same concept does 
not mean that Kenyan politics is violent by default, but the concept can help 
us unpack the situated behaviour and rationale of some of the central actors.
The chapter is based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork in Kenya on the 
Mungiki movement in the aftermath of the post-electoral violence in 2008, 
during the extra-judicial persecution by the police of Mungiki in 2009, during 
the constitutional referendum of 2010, and during the 2013 elections.3 The 
ethnographic material on Mungiki’s practices and political engagements is set 
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in relation to existing literature on the movement and to the bulk of literature 
on Kenyan elections and the country’s continued struggle for democracy.
The chapter continues by setting out the analytical foundation before going 
into three empirically founded sections: the first focuses on Mungiki’s mass 
actions and mobilisation, the second on the movement’s ideological baggage 
from the Mau Mau and its ability to transform, and thirdly on the parasitic 
nature of politics and violent action. Each section is organised in subsections 
providing analyses of Mungiki’s involvement across the three general elections 
from 2002 until 2013 and the role of violence or the struggle to contain it in 
these elections. In the conclusion, the chapter argues that electoral violence, 
as we can understand it through the notion of parasitic politics, reveals itself 
as relational, fuelled by competing claims and counter-claims, and groomed 
by the actualisation of historical misrecognitions and the instrumentalisation 
of collective identities, rather than being driven by a lack of civility and a 
lack of trust in the democratic aspect of elections. 
Deception and violence as political participation
Cheeseman (2015) and Collier (2010) have investigated the political economy 
of the dynamics of democracy and violence in Africa from a cross-country 
comparative perspective. They both depart from the positive potential for 
legitimacy and accountability inherent in democratisation, and the possibility 
for changing the course of events through the electoral process. Both authors 
point out that political participation – and maybe even the idea of democ-
racy itself – is often boiled down to the electoral process of casting the vote, 
and the dynamics of contestation and violent conflict are often linked to the 
possibility for change. 
The fact that all Kenyan elections since the introduction of multiparty 
democracy have been violent in one form or another testifies to the increased 
stakes for politicians in maintaining power; violence thus becomes a means to 
that end, even if the stakes and therefore the level of violence seem to drop 
at elections where the incumbent’s term comes to an end, like the 2002 and 
2013 elections in Kenya (Cheeseman 2015). Kenya’s history of ethnic voter 
mobilisation, which has created identity-based loyalties between politicians 
and their support bases, has also limited voters’ mobility to other political 
camps and has increased the risk of ethnic violence (cf. Collier 2010; Fjelde 
and Höglund, Chapter 1 in this volume). 
In addition, sub-Saharan Africa is facing a demographic challenge due 
to the enormous increase in the youth population, which casts poor and 
young first-time voters as the central actors of electoral democracy. On the 
one hand, the youth have the numbers to gain influence through the vote; 
on the other, they often constitute a marginalised group due to their lack of 
jobs and education and their limited possibilities for political participation. 




This is problematic in countries such as Kenya where voter registration and 
actual voting are time consuming and costly for the poor. Often, poor youths 
are considered a threat to democracy, and in many instances on the continent 
they constitute the main perpetrators of electoral violence (Anderson 2002; 
Christensen and Utas 2008; Strauss 2011). Paradoxically, the threat of violence 
or the violent act itself can be seen as a particular form of electoral participa-
tion in which the youths voice their dissatisfaction with the existing order and 
their chances for political participation and societal inclusion (Laakso 2007: 
227). This is no different in Kenya, where the Mungiki movement claims to 
represent the masses of poor youth, and where its political mobilisation has 
come to evoke immediate public fears of violence. 
The Mungiki movement embodies what I call ‘parasitic politics’ through its 
ability to transform and deceive, and to combine democratic participation and 
violent practices. Empirically, parasitic politics is derived from Mungiki’s use 
of two metaphors from Kikuyu mythology: the chameleon and the Mugumo 
tree (a parasitic fig tree). Mythologically, the latter is considered the tree of life 
and the former as the harbinger of death. Both metaphors inhibit the ability 
to transform: the chameleon through its ability to continuously change colour 
and blend in with its immediate surroundings, and the parasitic Mugumo tree 
through its ability to consume the host tree and take on a new form. The two 
metaphors point to Mungiki’s transformative and violent potential and also 
allude to ideas of a hidden core and a potentially deceptive surface. As such, 
Mungiki’s metaphors embrace notions of secrecy, deception and violence in 
relation to societal transformations, as well as reintroducing mythology and 
ancestral traditions as integral parts of Kenyan politics. 
In his work on the parasite as a grand metaphor for human relations, French 
philosopher Michel Serres (1982) merges notions of politics and mythology to 
describe how existing orders are challenged and re-worked (Brown 2002: 1). At 
the core of Serres’ characteristic of the parasite is the asymmetrical relation. 
Even if the preying parasite and the host might depend on each other, their 
relationship is always asymmetrical: one is feeding on the other (Serres 1982: 
55). Yet, together, the parasite and the host merge into a new and different 
whole. Through this parasitic process the normal flow of things – the existing 
order – is interrupted in order for something new to appear (ibid.). It is 
the characteristics of interruption, the inherently violent takeover, and the 
relational asymmetry and interdependence that make the parasite an intriguing 
metaphor for describing Mungiki’s mythologically infused political practice 
and its role in electoral violence in Kenya. While unpacking the chameleon 
and Mugumo tree metaphors, the chapter investigates the productive potential 
of deception for understanding Mungiki’s role in the dynamics of electoral 
violence in Kenya. 
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‘The born-again Mau Mau’: Mungiki’s economic and cultural 
background 
Mungiki is a movement dominated by youth from the Kikuyu tribe. Mungiki 
was founded in the rural parts of central Kenya in the late 1980s based on 
a revival of Kikuyu traditional religious beliefs (Wamue 2001). While formed 
in opposition to President Moi’s oppressive regime, Mungiki also had grudges 
against the Kikuyu political elite (Gecaga 2007). The movement claimed to be 
the biological and ideological grandchild of the Mau Mau movement that had 
fought for land and freedom during the struggle for independence in the 1950s. 
Ideologically, Mungiki is fighting against poverty, political and social 
exclusion, and for a correction of what their members perceive as historical 
injustices committed against the poor Kikuyu population. Mungiki adopted 
a range of secret rituals and operational structures from the Mau Mau. As 
such, Mungiki is founded on and guarded by a combination of revolutionary 
ideals and ritually sanctioned secrecy (Rasmussen forthcoming). In Kenya, 
any reference to Mau Mau oathing raises concern, as the oaths are widely 
associated with violent religiosity and obscenity (Blunt 2013: 168). Further-
more, Jomo Kenyatta used mass oathing in a deliberate attempt at secretly 
mobilising the Kikuyu population behind his presidency in 1968 (Knighton 
2010), which also associates oathing with the politicisation of ethnic identities 
and patronage politics.
Over the years, Mungiki has increased in numbers and gained strongholds 
in the Kikuyu-dominated areas of the poor neighbourhoods in Kenya’s major 
cities, where it has become involved in economic activities in the flourishing 
informal economy (Rasmussen 2012; Servant 2007). Through the involvement 
in the security sector and the public transport industry, Mungiki became 
involved in criminal and violent activities. It also became increasingly politi-
cised (Anderson 2002; Kagwanja 2005a). Due to the movement’s involvement 
in crime and violence, as well as its problematic relationship to some Kikuyu 
politicians, Mungiki was subjected to systematic police persecution in 2002 
and 2003 and most severely between 2007 and 2009 (Alston 2009; KNCHR 
2008; Oscar Foundation 2007; 2008). These events cast Mungiki members 
as not only perpetrators of violence but also victims of political violence, 
thus entering into a larger cycle of Kenyan electoral violence which is about 
settling old scores.
Since Mungiki’s foundation, the members’ public appearance has changed 
from dreadlocked young men flagging the movement’s colours of green, white, 
black and red, through snuff-taking lumpen youth in the matatu industry 
(Kenya’s informal means of public transportation), to Sunday church-goers 
wearing shirts and jackets. In terms of their public declaration of faith, members 
have moved from being Kikuyu traditionalists, through a brief flirtation with 
Islam in 2002 that saw them move back to the Kikuyu base, before converting 




to Pentecostalism in 2009. Mungiki simultaneously presents itself as a religious 
movement, a political party with widespread economic activities and with a 
militant wing, and a movement engaged in social development activities and 
farming on a local level. All these aspects testify to Mungiki’s potential to 
appear transformative and multiple at one and the same time. However, the 
leadership claims to remain true to the ideological core of fighting poverty, 
inequality and historical injustices. 
While the ability to change while staying true to the core ideals of the 
movement is important, especially in relation to the chameleon and Mugumo 
tree metaphors, the changes have often coincided with the violent persecution 
of the Mungiki leadership. The brief conversion to Islam in 2002 has largely 
been considered a diversion when the movement was seeking shelter from 
police persecution under the banner of a minority religion. Years later, local 
Mungiki members in Kayole playfully showed off Islamic registration cards, 
claiming that they could appear in a range of different identities.4 Similarly, 
when in October 2009 Maina Njenga and his followers publicly dissolved 
Mungiki and converted to Pentecostalism after Njenga’s release from prison, 
it was widely perceived as yet another sham intended to free Mungiki of its 
reputation as the perpetrator of the 2008 electoral violence. 
This doubt was only fuelled by the organisation’s initial choice of joining 
the controversial and opportunistic Bishop Margaret Wanjiru’s church, ‘Jesus 
Is Alive Ministries’ (JIAM). Wanjiru had pursued her political ambitions 
via the church and mobilised the support of her congregation to become a 
member of parliament (Kavulla 2008). She was hoping to benefit from the 
electoral support of the Mungiki members. However, these electoral ambitions 
never materialised for Wanjiru as Mungiki had its own agenda. For Mungiki’s 
members, the explicit combination of religion and politics resonated well 
with their former traditionalist beliefs, where religion and politics were not 
considered separate domains. Thus, the conversion paved the way for Maina 
Njenga’s ‘rebirth’ as a bishop and a politician and for the Mungiki members 
to present themselves as the ‘born again Mau Mau’.5 On the one hand, the 
dual meaning captured in this sentence describes a resurrection of the Mau 
Mau movement; on the other, it captures the former Mau Mau sympathisers 
who have converted to Pentecostalism through a ritual rebirth and conversion. 
The rebirth of the Mau Mau, even at the symbolic level, is associated with 
violence and political struggle for change.
Mobilising the masses Mungiki means multitude in the Kikuyu language, 
and there is an inherent claim and ambition of both being and representing the 
masses. Mungiki’s core recruitment base has been among the poor urban youth 
and the landless and disenfranchised young Kikuyu population. The power of 
Mungiki’s multitude ultimately has two potential expressions: that of a demo-
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cratic threat to the established political elite through the vote; and as a threat to 
democracy through violent outbursts and rioting by the dissatisfied and unruly 
youth population. 
The latest census on the demographic development in Kenya reveals that 
50 per cent of the population is below twenty-five years of age (KNBS 2009). 
Mungiki’s main recruitment base among the rapidly increasing youth popula-
tion – many of them first-time voters – has only added to the uncertainty 
about the movement’s potential impact, as this group is perceived to be easily 
influenced by their patrons. The potency of this indeterminable base of young 
Kikuyu voters is evident in the recurrent attempts by established politicians 
to mobilise Mungiki’s youth support. Being the largest ethnic group in Kenya, 
the Kikuyu make up an attractive constituency and the Kikuyu heartlands are 
traditionally among the most contested electoral constituencies as politicians 
strategise on how to either unify or divide the Kikuyu votes (Cheeseman 2008: 
168; Fjelde and Höglund, Chapter 1 in this volume; Mulli 1999).
Over the years, Mungiki spokespersons and commentators on the movement 
have differed over the size of the movement and the level of commitment 
of the members; the estimated numbers have ranged from several million 
supporters down to 30,000 core members (Rasmussen 2013; Ruteere 2008). 
The uncertainty about Mungiki’s size has itself been part of the movement’s 
political leverage, and the leadership has deliberately used this uncertainty to 
argue for their potential in influencing electoral results. By mobilising several 
thousand rowdy young men and creating visibility around their political gather-
ings, the movement has continuously managed to present the uncertainty of 
numbers as a potential voter base that should be taken seriously. The threat 
of violence through mass action prior to elections has been a central element 
of Mungiki’s force. We can situate this practice somewhere between voting 
and actual violence, as it is an act that potentially influences the turnout of 
opposition voters at the polling stations, yet it may not involve casting a vote 
nor the shedding of blood. 
In 2002, departing president Daniel arap Moi (from the Kalenjin tribe) 
and his chosen successor Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu) – posing as the youthful 
candidate to bring about the long-sought-for generational change of power – 
reached out to Mungiki. The relationship between the politicians and Mungiki 
was then described as a patron–client relation (Kagwanja 2005a: 64). A similar 
characterisation would suffice for Uhuru Kenyatta’s alleged use of Mungiki as 
a youth militia in the 2008 post-election violence. In 2003, President Mwai 
Kibaki (Kikuyu) – after winning a landslide victory against Uhuru Kenyatta 
in the 2002 elections – tried to counter Mungiki’s opposition and reach out 
to their members by commemorating and restoring their idol – the Mau Mau 
leader Dedan Kimathi (Kikuyu) – to national hero (Branch 2010: 316). And 
in 2013, Raila Odinga (from the Luo tribe) posed alongside Mungiki’s leader 




Maina Njenga at the family home of Dedan Kimathi in a similar attempt to 
tap into Njenga’s support base of young Kikuyu voters in Central Province, an 
area where Raila Odinga and Luo politicians traditionally have little support 
(Daily Nation 2012b). These attempts by successive politicians to reach out to 
Mungiki for electoral support testify to the importance of the Kikuyu youth as 
an electoral force that is recognised, but it also reveals the somewhat instru-
mental approach politicians often have towards the youth constituency. While 
hardly any politicians want to be directly associated with violent youths, the 
potential of numbers seems to outweigh the fear of association with electoral 
violence or the threat of it.
Mobilising the youth for change Over the years, Mungiki has proven its 
ability to mobilise in large numbers, thus putting action behind its claims of 
being indeterminate and representing the masses. But underlying the ability for 
mass mobilisation is also a strong ambition of mobilising for social change. In 
the campaigns prior to the 2002 elections, Mungiki displayed its strength in 
mobilising its members for direct political action by gathering several thousand 
people in Nairobi in support of Uhuru Kenyatta (Kagwanja 2005a: 63). Mungiki’s 
leadership argued that their support for Uhuru Kenyatta was an ideological 
support for generational change and for a youth revolution, not an issue of 
ethnic politics (Kagwanja 2005b). During the demonstrations, Mungiki members 
waved machetes and so-called ‘rungus’ (the Swahili word for a blunt wooden 
club used for fighting), alarming the press with their potential for violence (ibid.; 
Maupeu 2003). The police apparently turned a blind eye to the Mungiki members’ 
unruly behaviour and their display of weapons, which led to heavy criticism 
when the police shut down and dispersed a political rally by the opposition the 
following week (Kagwanja 2005a: 63). The police was criticised for using double 
standards, raising questions concerning the relation between the Moi–Uhuru 
alliance and the security forces. Moi was known for keeping close relations 
with the security forces and special units within the police (Katumanga 2013), 
a central element in maintaining political power, not only in Kenya (cf. Collier 
2010). Mungiki’s display of its violent potential in 2002 occurred mainly prior to 
the elections. 
In April 2008, thousands of Mungiki members rioted in Nairobi, bringing 
traffic and businesses to a standstill; this followed months of violent ethnic 
and politically motivated clashes as a reaction to the disputed 2007 elections, 
which saw Mwai Kibaki claim the presidency from Raila Odinga. The rioters 
protested against the extra-judicial killing of two of their leading figures and 
the wife of their chairman, Maina Njenga, allegedly carried out by secret police 
death squads (KNCHR 2009). Despite Mungiki members’ role as perpetra-
tors in the preceding post-election violence, the movement’s sudden mass 
appearance in the centre of the capital was a shock to many Kenyans. The 
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fact that Mungiki members were able to enter the city in large numbers and 
cause havoc despite police awareness of the movement and in spite of the 
re-emerging violent persecution of Mungiki members was a boost for the 
movement’s recruitment.6 In important ways, the riots also marked a shift in 
Mungiki’s violent mass appearance, as they were driven by the movement’s 
grievances against the current political regime (led by the Kikuyu Mwai Kibaki), 
whereas previous mass appearances had been mobilised by changing political 
patrons for voter support or violent intimidation, or had been centred around 
religious initiation rituals, or were turf wars with other youth groupings. The 
April 2008 Nairobi riots showed Mungiki members taking charge of their 
own agenda and directing their violent potential against the state that had 
allegedly mobilised them and called for their persecution.
In March 2010, hundreds of Mungiki members participated in a peace rally 
in Eldoret in the heartlands of the Kalenjin parts of Rift Valley. The rally saw 
Mungiki’s leadership appear on stage alongside former President Moi, both 
preaching peace and unity between the Kalenjin and Kikuyu ethnic groups and 
bringing together the most violent sections of their respective communities in 
the post-electoral violence of 2008. Interestingly, while Maina Njenga appeared 
on stage, Mungiki members dressed in suits and sunglasses were lined up 
in front of the crowd to provide security, whereas armed officers from the 
Administration Police stepped up when Moi entered the stage.7 Mungiki’s 
appearance at the Eldoret peace rally reveals its ability to strike deals with 
politicians controlling local segments of the security forces. Suddenly, Mungiki 
appeared as an advocate of peace. Simultaneously, the police persecution of 
Mungiki members saw them rebrand themselves as nationalist, in support of 
the progressive and rights-based constitution. In the period between the 2008 
post-electoral violence and the 2010 constitutional referendum, secret police 
units had systematically persecuted Mungiki and the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) had opened cases against Uhuru Kenyatta for mobilising Mungiki 
for retaliatory attacks during the 2008 elections. Central Mungiki members 
were among the proposed ICC witnesses and Mungiki saw the violent persecu-
tion as a politically led attempt at silencing witnesses. In these circumstances, 
Mungiki could pursue its ambitions for societal change and the correction 
of historical injustices through a change to a pro-constitutional rights-based 
agenda. Mungiki’s violent post-electoral engagements now saw the movement 
drawn into a cycle of state persecution, where the police were killing its 
members in order to cover up previous violent deeds in the fear of legal 
persecution from the ICC. Söderberg Kovacs’ example from Burundi in the 
introduction to this volume accounts for similar dynamics of cyclical electoral 
violence instated to secure impunity.
The 2013 elections took place in the dark and gloomy shadows of the post-
electoral violence of 2008, and enormous resources were invested in preaching 




peace and preventing a recurrence of electoral violence (Long et al. 2013). 
The ICC case against the Kikuyu Uhuru Kenyatta and the Kalenjin William 
Ruto brought the two candidates together in a political alliance where they 
respectively ran for president and vice president in the 2013 general election, 
an alliance that quickly became known as the ‘alliance of the accused’ (Lynch 
2014). Kenyatta and Ruto succeeded in capitalising on this political climate 
and managed to turn the ICC case against them into a question of national 
sovereignty and of international attempts at scapegoating the entire Kikuyu 
and Kalenjin societies for the violent deeds of a few (Mueller 2014). 
In the early stages of the 2013 electoral campaigns, Mungiki participated 
in a series of religious and political mass rallies using its usual tactics of 
displaying its ability to mobilise hordes of young men, only this time it made 
an effort to communicate its ability to contain their unruliness. However, 
its violent potential was constantly shimmering under the surface. In line 
with its stance in the constitutional referendum, Mungiki deliberately took 
up a position against ethnically infused politics. For instance, the Limuru 
rally in April 2012 was a peace meeting arranged as a direct critique of the 
ethno-cultural associations GEMA (Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association) in 
Central Province and KAMATUSA (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, Samburu) 
in Rift Valley for advocating tribalism and ethnic division.8 When the police 
interrupted and cancelled the political meeting in Limuru, the Mungiki crowd 
behaved relatively peacefully compared with previous years, when meetings 
often ended in running battles with the police (The Star 2012). Similarly, at 
a political gathering at Kamukunji Grounds in Nairobi in June 2012, where 
Mungiki’s leadership announced their effective takeover of the political party 
Mkenya Solidarity and launched their ambitions of running for seats at various 
electoral levels, Mungiki’s security team seemed to cooperate with the police 
in controlling the masses.9 
The 2013 elections were largely non-violent. A lot of resources had been put 
into advocating peace and preventing hate speech. The political leaders of the 
two warring factions of 2008 had teamed up in a political alliance. Mungiki’s 
leadership ended up withdrawing their political candidatures and encour-
aged their members to support the Luo candidate Raila Odinga. Mungiki’s 
role during the actual vote, however, seemed to have a limited impact on 
Raila Odinga’s result in the constituencies covering Mungiki’s strongholds, as 
Uhuru won landslide victories in the Kikuyu-dominated areas (IEBC 2013). 
Maina Njenga’s public support for a non-Kikuyu candidate did not go uncon-
tested in the ranks of Mungiki, and some members decided to go against the 
public recommendations of their chairman and voted for Uhuru Kenyatta.10 
In Nakuru, members posed as bodyguards for opposing political candidates, 
testifying both to the internal split in Mungiki and to the pragmatic logic of 
lending one’s muscle to the best-paying patron. 
186
The highest stake in the 2013 elections was legal persecution for instigating 
human rights abuses carried out by Mungiki. The dominant narrative of peace 
in the 2013 elections was a constant reminder of the violence of 2008, and 
the campaigns effectively turned the elections into a fight against foreign legal 
intervention (meaning the ICC). The elections might have been peaceful, but 
the violence was omnipresent. Mungiki’s members again proved their ability to 
mobilise and contain huge crowds in the run-up to the elections, but they did 
not influence the vote. Their ability to initiate change seemed to be reduced 
to their violent capacity or the threat of violence. 
Harbingers of death: religious appearances, mythological references 
and violent potential 
When members of Mungiki refer to their transformations they often use 
metaphors, especially the chameleon and the Mugumo tree. As noted earlier, 
metaphorically the chameleon refers to the ability to adapt to changing situ-
ations, and to appear as something different from and other than what it 
seems to be. Analytically, it concerns the ability to transform, and opens up 
for discussion the question of whether the chameleon’s true character is its 
ability to change colour and surface appearance or whether its true character 
is to be found in its shape or behaviour. The Mungiki members’ use of the 
chameleon metaphor accentuates this problem, as the metaphor constantly 
teases out questions of whether their façade shrouds a concealed truth or 
whether it is solely a surface appearance or a diversion. In this sense, the 
chameleon metaphor diverts attention from the movement’s religious and 
political project. This is also where the power of the chameleon lies, as it 
assumes that there is a depth or a truth that is hidden; that underneath the 
façade there is something politically important and potent yet hidden from 
public view and knowledge.
However, the chameleon can refer to more than unpredictability and the 
ability to transform itself and appear in multiple forms. In Kikuyu mythology, 
the chameleon is presented as the harbinger of death. To summarise briefly, 
the chameleon was sent by God to tell the Kikuyu people that they should 
never die, but he failed to deliver the message properly and ended up being 
humiliated by the Kikuyu people who chased him away. Soon afterwards, the 
Kikuyu started dying.
Mungiki was made illegal prior to the 2002 general elections following 
a turf war with a rival Luo gang in the Nairobi estate of Kariobangi, where 
the intergroup fighting resulted in running battles in the streets and targeted 
killings with machetes (Maupeu 2002). The fighting became known as the 
Kariobangi massacre. The rival gangs competed over the right to provide 
informal security in the neighbourhoods of Nairobi’s Eastlands and over control 
of lucrative matatu routes. Politicians saw the potential in linking up with 




the disaffected youth in charge of the provision of everyday services such as 
security, transport and rubbish collection, as they could serve the purposes 
of anything from voting fodder to violent intimidation. Mungiki proved espe-
cially skilled in capitalising on the political interest of violent youth militias, 
and, instead of facing persecution, Mungiki stuck a deal whereby the police 
turned a blind eye to Mungiki’s forceful takeover of the most lucrative matatu 
routes in Eastlands in return for political support. Mungiki leaders even made 
public declarations about being protected by the government (Anderson 2002: 
538–40; Kagwanja 2005a: 64). The Kariobangi massacre not only instilled a 
fear of Mungiki among the public, it also affected the 2002 elections in direct 
ways, as it helped Mungiki carve out an economic platform for political and 
violent engagements. However, due to the level of violence, Uhuru Kenyatta 
and Moi also had to publicly disassociate themselves from the unruly youth 
they had reached out to. The ban of Mungiki was a central element in this 
process, and so was the barring of Maina Njenga’s parliamentary candidature 
later in the year.
Despite the ban, which was still in force, and the erratic persecution of 
Mungiki, the movement managed to make a new deal of non-persecution prior 
to the 2007 elections, as their numerical and violent potential was called on 
once again by the Kikuyu political elite (ICC 2015; TJRC 2013; Waki Commission 
2008). The late December announcement of the electoral result granting the 
incumbent Mwai Kibaki victory over Raila Odinga was immediately disputed 
and sparked countrywide protests and riots. In Rift Valley in particular, many 
ordinary Kikuyus suffered politically and ethnically motivated attacks, once 
again bringing old grievances over land to the fore (see Fjelde and Höglund, 
Chapter 1 in this volume). According to the ICC prosecutor’s pre-trial briefs, 
Uhuru Kenyatta and other politicians held meetings with Mungiki, paying its 
members to conduct retaliatory attacks, helping them get hold of weapons, and 
granting them passage through police roadblocks (ICC 2015: 18–21).11 Mungiki’s 
violence killed several hundred people and displaced thousands. All human 
rights briefs and commission reports looking into the post-election violence 
present Mungiki and the police as the main perpetrators. In addition to these 
gruesome effects of the post-electoral violence, a further consequence was the 
ICC charge of human rights violations against Uhuru Kenyatta. As already 
mentioned, the ICC case greatly affected the 2013 elections and resulted in 
the extra-judicial persecution of Mungiki members, and it continues to cast 
shadows on Kenyan politics despite the ICC dropping the charges against 
Uhuru Kenyatta in 2014, due to a lack of evidence and what the court claimed 
was witness intimidation (ibid.).
Mungiki’s involvement in the post-electoral violence and the brutality of the 
Kariobangi massacre earned the movement an image of youth militants for hire 
and a threat to democracy. The media similarly presented them as a menace 
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to society, associated with crime, ritualised obscenity, and brutal violence. If 
we think of the mythological meaning of the chameleon, the members’ use of 
the chameleon metaphor takes on an ironic (and perhaps unintended) twist, 
because Mungiki literally is perceived as the harbinger of death. 
But the metaphor allows for additional interpretative twists. Recall Mungiki’s 
experience as being marginalised and excluded, then think of it as analogous 
to the fate of the vanishing and humiliated chameleon being chased away by 
the (now deadly) Kikuyu people who hoped to grow fat from the land. In this 
rendition, the chameleon metaphor captures the continuous tension between 
Mungiki and the Kikuyu political elite, a tension that unfolds around percep-
tions of betrayal, failure and exclusion – which, as we have seen, is particularly 
prominent around elections. The persecution and the extra-judicial killings of 
Mungiki by the police and the trade-offs guaranteeing safety in exchange for 
violence and votes can be understood as outcomes of interrupted and failed 
communication, resulting in a troubled and conflictual relationship causing 
death and grievance.
And there is yet another twist to the mythological prophecy of the chameleon 
bringing death to the fat Kikuyu people. Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Kenya’s first 
independent president, Jomo Kenyatta, and heir to the Kenyatta family’s wealth, 
was accused by the ICC of planning and instigating part of the post-election 
violence of 2008. Key witnesses against Uhuru Kenyatta at the ICC were former 
Mungiki members. Prior to the 2013 elections, there was still a possibility 
of Mungiki witnesses exposing Uhuru Kenyatta and bringing political death 
to Kenya’s most celebrated political family. At that time, and before the ICC 
dropped the charges, the chameleon was still shimmering in its skin. 
The numerous possibilities of interpretation and for merging mythological 
meaning with politically and violently infused action provide the chameleon 
metaphor with its explanatory strength. One can choose to focus either on 
the chameleon’s changing colour or on its interior character, but, either way, 
the metaphor will always reveal the possibility of the other – and thus it 
is strategically incomplete. This is an important element in understanding 
Mungiki’s shifting political alliances and its constant potential.
Parasitic politics: forceful takeovers from the inside
In Kenyan politics there is a long tradition of using violent youth militias for 
support and to intimidate opponents (Kagwanja 2001; 2009; Mueller 2008: 
189), and Mungiki members have acted in this capacity in the past. Even 
if the Mungiki members have reformed and abandoned their criminal and 
violent ways, their violent activities of the past still maintain political power. 
On several occasions, the movement has hinted at the possibility of using 
inside knowledge of past alliances to discredit former political patrons. In 
May 2012, Maina Njenga claimed that almost all politicians from the Kikuyu 




heartlands in Central Kenya have used Mungiki for their political survival at 
some point (Daily Nation 2012a), indicating that no one has clean hands and 
that no one should feel safe from exposure.
The idea of gaining political leverage from secret knowledge of others recalls 
Mungiki’s other metaphor, the Mugumo tree – the parasite that grows on 
other trees. The tree has aerial roots that stretch to the ground and entangle 
and subsume the host tree. Metaphorically it evokes images of strength and 
power inherent in its parasitic nature, but it also points to relational aspects 
between host and parasite, a violent and antagonistic yet symbiotic process 
through which a new tree emerges. The Mugumo tree and the parasitic process 
direct our attention to Mungiki’s ever-changing relationship with its political 
patrons and to the police who violently persecute the movement.
For Mungiki members, the Mugumo tree is a powerful and ambiguous 
metaphor. It allows Mungiki members to think of themselves as part of a 
potent collective with the capacity to act as parasites on the matatu industry, 
on Margaret Wanjiru’s JIAM church, on the Mkenya Solidarity party and 
on the Kikuyu political elite. As has been shown, Mungiki managed to gain 
economically and politically from the Kariobangi massacre, and its violent 
takeover of lucrative matatu routes and its continuous forceful control have 
allowed the movement to raise money and create jobs for its members. In that 
sense, they are living off – or acting as parasites on – the matatu industry 
(Katumanga 2005; Rasmussen 2012).
In a blunt statement, Maina Njenga admitted a similar parasitic approach 
to the movement’s Pentecostal conversion, as a newspaper quoted him telling 
Bishop Margaret Wanjiru in front of her congregation: ‘This church is no 
longer yours. Now it is ours!’ (Daily Nation 2009). By bringing in numerous 
Mungiki members to the congregation, he implied that they would take over 
her church. A similar process took place when Mungiki effectively took over 
the political party Mkenya Solidarity in 2012. As early as 2008, individual 
Mungiki members began registering as ordinary members of the Mkenya 
Solidarity party immediately after the government had turned down Mungiki’s 
registration of its own political wing, the Kenya National Youth Alliance.12 
These registrations to Mkenya Solidarity continued until June 2012, when Maina 
Njenga publicly declared his leadership of the party at a rally on Kamukunji 
Grounds in Nairobi, much to the surprise of the original founder, G. G. 
Kariuki. Both examples reveal a swallowing of the host from within.
The symbiotic relationship between the parasite and the host as described by 
Serres (1982) reveals that the transformative aspect of parasitism does not free 
the parasite of the host when it has entangled it. Rather, the host is subsumed 
and becomes part of the new collective body. Understanding Mungiki through 
the Mugumo tree metaphor thus allows for an inside perspective that is still 
contextually open. 
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Through Mungiki’s violent activities in relation to electoral and political 
events, we can see how the movement acted as a parasite on its political 
patrons by accepting money or negotiating a truce with the police. At the 
same time, it acted as a parasite on the local Kikuyu communities by extorting 
money from the matatu industry or by inserting its members as dreaded 
security providers. Through some of its actions, Mungiki effectively acted in 
a state-like manner or claimed a state-like authority; by doing so, Mungiki 
acted as a parasite on the state while embodying its character.
The Mugumo tree The explanatory qualities of the Mugumo tree metaphor go 
beyond its parasitic capacity revealed through the ambiguous and transformative 
aspects that characterise the relationship between host and parasite. Like the 
chameleon, the Mugumo tree also features in Kikuyu mythology. It is perceived 
as sacred and as the tree of life under which the Kikuyu tribe came into being. 
Furthermore, it serves a range of ritual purposes, and a legend reveals how the 
Mugumo tree is a medium through which the Kikuyu people communicate with 
their god through sacrifice and daily prayers (Beech 1913: 4; Karangi 2008: 122). 
Traditionally, some of the initiation rituals for the transition to adulthood were 
performed under the Mugumo tree, and the Kikuyu council of elders would hold 
its meetings there (Kenyatta 1938). In reference to these rituals and meetings, the 
Mau Mau took some of their oaths under the Mugumo tree. 
Karangi (2008) has argued that the Mugumo tree has been neglected in 
attempts at understanding the cosmology of the Kikuyu. He sees the Mugumo 
tree as a reference point for the continuity of the social, religious and political 
world of the Kikuyu, with the tree symbolising fertility, survival, protection, 
belonging, religious access and political power (ibid. 117, 127–8). Therefore, 
when Mungiki members describe their movement as being like the Mugumo 
tree they not only refer to the immediate parasitic qualities of the tree; they 
also symbolically refer to themselves as having access to a vast register of past 
cultural, social, religious and political knowledge in the present and for the 
future. Mungiki’s metaphorical references to the mythology invest the move-
ment with the power of the Mugumo tree and fill it with parasitic agency, and 
its members become agents of change. Their parasitic behaviour is legitimised 
not only through notions of fairness and due to experiences of historical 
and structural injustice. More importantly, it is legitimised by reference to 
the mythology. As such, Mungiki advocates and practises a different form of 
politics, even if it sometimes mirrors the wider perception of Kenyan politics 
as deceptive.
However, former Mungiki members do not have exclusive ownership of the 
symbolic power of the Mugumo tree, nor of Kikuyu rituals such as oathing. In 
the spring of 2012, there were widespread rumours of secret oathing ceremonies 




in support of Uhuru Kenyatta taking place at night, allegedly initiated by 
Kikuyu elders in order to unite the Kikuyu voters behind a Kikuyu presidential 
candidate and to oppose the ICC intervention. In February 2013, a Mugumo 
tree fell in Nyeri; this, according to legend, signals a generational change of 
guard within the Kikuyu community. In other words, the departing President 
Kibaki would be succeeded by a younger Kikuyu, which in this case could only 
mean Uhuru Kenyatta.13 These examples show that other parts of the Kikuyu 
community are also influenced by secret ritualistic, prophetic and mythical 
knowledge in their political practices. 
If we return to the idea of parasitic practices and the question of who is 
acting as a parasite on whom, it can also be argued that the Kenyan state and 
the Kikuyu political elite have been parasites on the Mungiki movement and 
its militant services. They have used the movement’s violent and numerical 
services whenever they needed them, but Mungiki has been violently discarded 
through extra-judicial persecution whenever it posed a threat. Mungiki, for 
its part, has used its bad reputation as a weapon to disentangle itself from its 
previous patronage networks. Through its ability to continuously transform and 
appear politically relevant, Mungiki has managed to take a position in Kenyan 
politics where its patronage cannot be taken for granted. Mungiki members 
posing as key witnesses at the ICC is the best illustration of this. Mungiki uses 
its reputation as a dreaded militant sect to remain important, yet the ability 
of the movement to transform from anti-Christian ethnic traditionalists to 
a nationalist rights-based pro-constitution movement reveals that nothing is 
static. Parasitic politics is inherently violent, whether conducted by Mungiki 
or used as a characteristic of Kenyan politics in general.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown how narratives (traditional and ritually infused) as 
a source for violent political mobilisation draw on a vast register of perceived 
injustices; this is similar to Fjelde and Höglund’s (Chapter 1) convincing argu-
ment that a historical analysis of conflict patterns reveals how contemporary 
electoral violence is often informed by the past politics of differentiation and 
the politicisation of past identity conflicts. The chapter has shown how Mungiki, 
through its violent and parasitic practices, has played a central role in electoral 
violence over the last couple of decades. In the 2007 elections, Mungiki’s violent 
potential – first displayed in 2002 – grabbed the headlines and defined the 
post-electoral chaos. Even in the supposedly peaceful 2013 elections, when the 
central concern was maintaining peace and containing violence, the process was 
tainted by past violence; this is best exemplified by the influence of the ICC 
case as a decisive theme. The chapter has shown how the potential for violence 
becomes a powerful resource for influencing the political agenda, even if the 
potential is not actualised. Through the skilful play of the threat of violence, 
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secret knowledge and mythological power, the Mungiki movement practises 
politics in a different way from that of the established political elite – though 
it is far from unfamiliar. By focusing on the role of deception and on parasitic 
feeding on one another, the chapter has revealed how we can understand the 
former Mungiki movement’s quest for political inclusion, influence and power.
Furthermore, informal institutions such as youth militias that were estab-
lished for political ends during authoritarian rule in Kenya have lived on after 
the turn to multiparty democracy; these informal political actors, like Mungiki, 
are used by the formal state as well as acting on their own. The chapter has 
shown how the continued existence and influence of informal political and 
violent organisations in the democratic era threatens the establishment of 
formal institutions and easily informs electoral conflicts (cf. Söderberg Kovacs, 
Introduction in this volume). The chapter has revealed that similar methods 
of secrecy and deception are at play at the centre of Kenyan politics. The aim 
here is not to argue that Kenyan politics is inherently immoral or by default 
corrupt. Rather, the aim has been to investigate the workings of violence and 
deception in relation to the electoral process. The tension between politicians 
and Mungiki in the ICC case presents itself as an extreme case for unfolding 
the deceptive work going on in the quest for power because it plays out across 
several electoral periods, drawing from the first engagements between Mungiki 
and the Kikuyu political elite, covering the 2007 post-electoral violence, and 
continuing until the abandoned ICC court case. Youth militias such as Mungiki 
and their influence on elections have historical roots, and they are intimately 
linked to politicians and remain influential in formal politics and on the ability 
of formal and legal institutions to function.
Mungiki’s ability to change and constantly transform has been an essential 
part of the movement’s power, as it is constantly transgressing the boundaries 
between the formal and the informal, the legal and the illegal. This is captured 
in the chameleon metaphor, where the true appearance of the movement – 
whether there is a true appearance at all – is constantly questioned. As such, 
Mungiki has not been stabilised and it presents a constant potential for violence 
to outsiders. This has provided the movement with influence on politics, and 
not only at election time. 
Mungiki’s role in Kenyan politics as an institutionalised political, religious 
and violent movement is best explored by looking at the relation between 
violence and elections, as elections have become critical encounters for 
Mungiki’s parasitic practices. Through its metaphorical reference to Kikuyu 
mythology, Mungiki merges not only politics and violence but also politics and 
mythology, which allows for an analytical understanding of electoral violence 
in Kenya as more than merely anti-democratic and uncivil. Electoral violence 
must be understood as a form of participation that draws on other registers 
of knowledge that we usually associate with democratic practice and politics. 




In doing so, the relational aspect of electoral violence as it has taken place 
in Kenya in recent years reveals itself, and it resonates with broader notions 
of deception and patronage that characterise Kenyan politics. 
The existence of informal institutions with the potential for violence close to 
the core of formal political decision making and electoral politics has enormous 
implications for policy, as different logics are at play simultaneously. When 
such logics are present, yet hidden or denied, planning for peaceful electoral 
processes risks overlooking not only the vested interests at various levels, 
but also – and just as importantly – how these interests are interlinked and 
connected in intricate ways.
Notes
1 Author interview with Mungiki 
leader from Nakuru commenting on the 
movement’s role in the 2008 post-electoral 
violence, March 2009.
2 The 1992 general elections in Kenya 
are a good example of how ethnic interests 
were strategically protected through the 
orchestration of violence (see Fjelde and 
Höglund, Chapter 1 in this volume).
3 I appreciate the financial support 
for fieldwork from the Danish Research 
Council for Culture and Communication 
between 2008 and 2010, and from the 
UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
for funding fieldwork during the 2013 
elections. 
4 Author’s fieldnotes, December 2008.
5 This was a recurrent phrase used by 
Mungiki members in the months after the 
Pentecostal conversion.
6 In interviews with Mungiki members 
carried out between August 2008 and May 
2009, the Nairobi riots were mentioned 
more than twenty times by different 
members, referring to the movement’s 
ability for mass mobilisation, but especially 
to its ability to disrupt and bring the capital 
city to a halt.
7 Author observations from the Eldoret 
peace rally, March 2010.
8 GEMA and KAMATUSA respectively 
supported the Kikuyu candidate Uhuru 
Kenyatta and the Kalenjin candidate 
William Ruto. Promoted as a peace 
meeting, the Limuru meeting presented 
the former Mungiki movement with the 
chance of distancing itself from the old 
ethnic organisations and instead allowed it 
to claim a pro-peace nationalist agenda. 
9 Kamukunji observations conducted 
for the author by Armstrong Obissa, a 
Kenyan sociologist, 9 June 2012.
10 Interviews and observations with 
Mungiki members in Kayole and Nakuru, 
December 2012 and February 2013. 
11 The former spokesperson of 
Mungiki, Nguguna Githau, accounted for 
the same process in a conversation with 
this author in February 2009. He was shot 
dead in April 2009.
12 Author’s fieldnotes and interviews, 
November 2008.
13 According to an old prophecy by 
the Kikuyu prophet Mugo wa Kibero, 
a fallen Mugumo tree in Thika would 
symbolise the end of colonial rule, which 
actually happened in 1963, and the fallen 
Mugumo tree in Nyeri was interpreted 
along similar lines (The Standard 2013).
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